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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT, CHARLES B. BUGGER 
ARGUMENT 
X. APPELLANT MAINTAINS THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF FACT 
ACCURATELY REFLECTS THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AS TO THE 1983 
FILING OF A DECREE OF ANNULMENT. 
The Appellant (hereinafter "Charles") challenges the 
accuracy and veracity of the use of the Affidavit of Kenn M. 
Hanson in Respondent's brief. The nature of an "affidavit" is 
such that it merely creates a rebuttable presumption,1 and the 
averments of an affidavit should be true and stated positively, 
containing evidentiary facts, not an opinion or legal 
conclusion.2 However, averments of fact based upon information 
and belief lack evidentiary value because they are considered 
mere hearsay; thus barred by the rules of evidence governing 
1
 Lavton City v. Bennett. 741 P.2d 965 ((Utah. App. 1987), 
cert, denied 765 P.2d 1277. 
2
 2A C.J.S. AFFIDAVITS §47. 
1 
hearsay.3 In addition, when used as evidence, an affidavit is 
commonly regarded as weak evidence that should be received with 
caution and not conclusive of the facts stated therein.4 
In this case, Respondent's brief makes conclusive statements 
that Kenn Hanson, the 1983 counsel of record, "prepared the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Decree of 
Annulment and submitted them to the Court for entry, [and that] 
Mr. Hanson prepared an affidavit stating that he prepared the 
findings and the decree and submitted them to the court for 
filing and entry." (Appellee's Brief at 4). However, these 
conclusory statements are in direct opposition to the Trial 
Court's findings, as well as the affiant's statements. 
First, Mr. Hanson's Affidavit did not state that the 
documents he prepared were in fact submitted. Rather, Mr. Hanson 
merely states that it was, and still is, his practice to timely 
prepare, then submit all Orders of the Court and follow up on any 
matter submitted, and that to the best of his knowledge he 
followed that practice (Hanson Aff. para. 8 - 11). Secondly, 
the record attests to the fact that Mr. Hanson could not recall 
specifically calling the Court to follow up on the documents he 
prepared (R. at 3, line 25). This suggests that Mr. Hanson did 
not submit the documents he prepared for entry, nor follow up on 
the matter submitted. 
Finally, the record is clear that the Court ruled "based on 
3
 2A C.J.S. AFFIDAVITS §49; 32A C.J.S. EVIDENCE §194. 
4
 Audit Services v. Kraus Const., Inc., 615 P.2d 183 (Mont. 
1980); see also, 32A C.J.S. EVIDENCE § 1032. 
the evidence that has been presented at this point, the Court is 
going to find that a Decree of Annulment, Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law to support a Decree of Annulment were never 
entered in this particular case." (R. at 11, line 9). Simply 
put, Respondent's statements are not based on actual fact, thus 
conclusory, and in direct opposition to the trial court's 
findings. 
II. AS OPPOSED TO THE ASSERTIONS MADE IN RESPONDENT'S BRIEF, THE 
DELAY IN RENDERING THE FINAL DECREE WAS NOT DUE TO THE 
COURT'S NEGLIGENCE, BUT RATHER MR. HANSON'S FAILURE TO 
SUBMIT AND FOLLOW THROUGH WITH HIS COURT APPOINTED DUTIES. 
Under Utah law, nunc pro tunc Orders are appropriate only 
when it is established that the delay was due to circumstances 
beyond the control of the parties to the action.5 In the present 
case, the Respondent was unable to provide a showing of any act 
of negligence by the Court. Additionally, Respondent was unable 
to provide direct evidence that Mr. Hanson did in fact submit or 
follow through with the Orders he prepared. Thus, the delay in 
the entering of the final decree was not due to any negligent act 
by the Court, but rather Mr. Hanson's failure to follow through 
with his Court appointed obligations. Therefore, the Decree of 
Annulment entered Nunc Pro Tunc in this case should be set aside 
due to plain error. 
5
 Bacrshaw v. Baashaw, 788 P.2d 1057, (Utah App. 1990) (nunc 
pro tunc allows a court to correct its earlier error or supply its 
omission when a decision has been rendered and the decision has not 
been properly recorded through no fault of the parties). 
3 
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF "GOOD CAUSE" IS NOT SUPPORTED 
BY ENOUGH LEGAL OR FACTUAL SUPPORT TO WARRANT THE USE OF ITS 
NUNC PRO TUNC POWER. 
On appeal, courts applying nunc pro tunc power have been 
upheld where the court itself has failed to properly record the 
decision due to any "cause not attributable to the laches of the 
parties, but within the control of the court."6 The statutory 
provision granting this power is as follows: 
A court having jurisdiction may, upon its finding of 
good cause and giving of such notice as may be ordered, 
enter an order nunc pro tunc in a matter relating to 
marriage, divorce, legal separation or annulment of 
marriage. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-41-a (1983). Since "good cause" hinges upon 
the particular facts of a case, it is determined on a case by 
case basis. In this case, the Trial Court tacitly implied that 
the delay in rendering the final decree was not due to Court 
error when it ruled that no Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
or Decree of Annulment had ever been entered in this particular 
case. Thus, whether viewed as a factual matter or an issue of 
law, no "good cause" exists for a nunc pro tunc ruling. As such, 
the nunc pro tunc ruling should be set aside. 
If assumed, arguendo, that "good cause" is supportable in 
this case, the 1994 documentation is not consistent with the 
record of the 1983 ruling as ordered by the Trial Court. A nunc 
pro tunc order enters a now for then record of an order 
previously made and is used to make the record speak the truth, 
6
 Mitchell v. Overman, 103 U.S. 62, 26 L.Ed. 369 (1881) as 
quoted in Bagshaw, 788 P.2d at 1060-61. 
4 
not to correct the court's failure to speak.7 However, as 
previously presented, the 1994 Decree and supporting 
documentation are significantly inconsistent with the 1983 ruling 
but are in complete harmony with the documentation alleged to 
have been prepared in 1983 by Mr. Hanson. Thus, the 1994 
documentation is not supportable under the nunc pro tunc criteria 
and, as a matter of law, the ruling should be set aside. 
In light of all the surrounding relevant evidence presented 
to the court, the Trial Court's finding of a nunc pro tunc order 
and the resulting documentation are clearly erroneous. Therefore, 
this Court should set aside the nunc pro tunc ruling as a matter 
of law because that ruling is not supported by any evidence of 
court error, nor a showing of "good cause".8 
IV. LACK OF NOTICE IN THE FILING OF AN ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
CONSISTENT WITH A TRIAL COURT'S FINAL RULING IN WHICH BOTH 
PARTIES WERE PRESENT AND AFFORDED AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD 
HAS BEEN HELD BY THIS COURT TO BE HARMLESS ERROR. 
Although, generally speaking, there are notice requirements 
for the filing of documents based on a Trial Court's final 
ruling, the lack of such notice in circumstances found in the 
present case is not a due process violation but rather harmless 
error. This submission is premised on the fact that 1) the 1983 
7
 Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984). 
8
 Brief of Appellant, Point I(A),(B),(C), pg. 11-15 
provides a complete discussion of how the law defines "good cause" 
and applies that meaning in a nunc pro tunc order relating to 
annulment of marriage. 
5 
Trial Court's ruling was based on the evidence presented by the 
parties who were present and given an opportunity to be heard;9 
and 2) since due process was afforded at trial, the filing of 
documents entirely consistent with the Trial Court's findings 
preclude a due process violation based on lack of notice for such 
filings. Rather, this Court has held that such lack of notice 
is merely harmless error.10 Therefore, unless Respondent can 
show that Judge Condor's 1983 findings of fact were clearly 
erroneous, or that Charles's entry of judgment based on the 
transcript of Judge Condor's ruling has substantial and 
prejudicial error, this Court should find Charles' failure to 
provide notice as harmless error. 
CONCLUSION 
Charles challenges the veracity of the use of Kenn M. 
Hanson's Affidavit in the Respondent's brief. Charles maintains 
that the Trial Court's finding of fact accurately reflects the 
evidence presented as to the filing, or lack thereof, of a Decree 
of Annulment, Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law in 1983. 
Under Utah law, nunc pro tunc Orders are only appropriate when 
the delay is due to a court's actions and through no fault of the 
parties. In opposition to the assertions made in Respondent's 
brief, the evidence suggests that the delay in rendering of the 
9
 Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983). 
10
 Workman v. Nagle, 802 P.2d 749 (Utah App. 1990) (held: 
prevailing party's failure to notify opponents of entry of judgment 
does not make the judgment ineffective, but is rather harmless 
error) . 
6 
final decree was due to Mr. Hanson's failure to submit and follow 
through with his court appointed duties, rather than any 
negligence on the part of the Court- The Trial Court ordered 
Respondent to submit a Decree of Annulment and its supporting 
documents to be consistent with Judge Condor's 1983 ruling. 
However, Respondent's 1994 documentation was not consistent with 
the nunc pro tunc criteria, but rather with the original 
documentation drafted by Mr. Hanson. Therefore, the Trial 
court's nunc pro tunc ruling, as well as the Respondent's 1994 
Decree entered Nunc Pro Tunc should be set aside due to plain 
error. 
In addition, Charles asks this Court to find the lack of 
notice for filing a Finding of Fact based on Judge Condor's 
ruling and signed by Judge Medley, as harmless error. Unless 
Respondent can show harm, or substantial and prejudicial error in 
Judge Condor's ruling or the Finding of Fact based on that 
ruling, no due process claim may be supported since the 
Respondent was already on notice as the content of that ruling. 
Based on the foregoing arguments, Charles respectfully asks 
this Court to set aside the Trial Court's nunc pro tunc ruling, 
as well as Respondent's 1994 Decree of Annulment entered Nunc Pro 
Tunc and rule that the lack of notice was harmless error. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18th day of May, 1995. 
IYI Gary i/ Bell 
Attorney for Appellant 
Charles B. Bugger 
7 
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